A Bit More Extensively on the Border Situation

There was bout without a great deal happening in Finland besides the border crisis, which has now gone into remission. As such, I didn’t write an update last week. A celebrity got #metooed, a feminist author is accused of plagiarism, the Olkiluoto nuclear plant is going through another bout of downtimes and electricity prices are wobbly – all these something seen before and without that much room for analysis.

However, what about the border crisis? That certainly featured even in foreign news for a while, and it’s that the recent minor asylum crisis at the Finnish-Russia border and the subsequent border closure were tied to the event is uncontroversially tied to the War in Ukraine, naturally something that has dominated Finnish and European foreign policy and the related things since February 2022 (even before that, in fact).

The foreign event that this one resembles the most happened, however, already in 2021. Those who paid attention to things not related to viruses and vaccines in that year might remember a crisis at the Baltic/Belarus borders; numerous refugees attempted empty to Europe and where, in many cases, physically pushed out by border guards, with tacit acceptance from the European authorities.

At this time already it was considered likely that the refugee entry was a connivance by Putin and Lukashenko to assess the willingness of EU to take in refugees, whatever the situation. As such, it was a part of the long drumbeat preceding the Ukrainian invasion.

Almost immediately after February 2022, Finland started a process to enter NATO. At this time there were widespread speculations that Russia would being “mischief” (a literal translation of the rather odd term “kiusanteko” that has become standard in Finnish media to refer to low-level below-warfare ops) to prevent NATO membership, but despite all the fears that Russians might, for instance, occupy some uninhabited hill to create a fake territorial conflict, there was a fairly restrained reaction from the Russian authorities to this process. Until the actual membership happened, that is.

In September 2023, as a part of the attempts to shore up the sanctions regime and as a part of a tit-for-tat diplomatic spats, Finland started restricting the entry ofv Russian private cars for import and soon after that started limiting tourist visas. In October, as a response, Russia declared the border treaty to have ended. Soon after that, the refugees started arriving.

The Russian claim is that it is a natural consequence of the border treaty being ended, but whatever the case, there have still been heavy signs that the Russians have encouraged and facilitated this migration through online channels or more drastic means, such as allowing people without proper documentation to pass through Russia.

And, in any case, the same happening in 2021 with Belarus and Poland/Lithuania – with Lukashenko just about openly stating that it is a part of a process of punishment for these countries for not pushing Ukraine towards a treaty with Russia – would indicate the same.

Anyhow, after the numbers of refugees had crossed some hundreds and the government quickly concluded that there would be larger and larger numbers coming, it reacted with a progressive closure of border points – first the southernmost four border points (i.e. the ones actually used by most people, including those coming from St. Petersburg or Petrozavodsk, then all but one (Raja-Jooseppi on the bare frozen North), and finally, after getting indications that this was possible, Raja-Jooseppi as well, closing physical entry from Russia for two weeks.

Technically, if one wishes to cross the freezing forest (in parts not covered by the new Finland-Russia border fence) and then got to the authorities, they could still want asylum. This is, as one might guess, quite difficult, and the border entries have stopped (though they had already fallen to low single digits during the one-passing phase). The current permitted method of seeking for asylum is entering through a port or an airport, neither of which necessitates entry from Russia anyhow.

This happened slightly haltingly at first – the government wanted to close the entire border from the get-go but could only do it after getting a sign from the Chancellor of Justice that it is possible, after the Deputy Chancellor of Justice had indicated that one closing would have to be left open. It escapes me what the genuine difference between these was, considering both positions were clearly intended to make trying to get asylum as hard as possible, but there you go.

There are currently no indications as to whether this would be continued after those two weeks. It would depend on what happens at that time – if the refugees start trickling in again, well, the pressure would be great to close the borders again and do it for a longer time.

This pressure would, of course, most affect the nationalist Finns Party, many of whose supporters were hopping mad that the party didn’t close the border immediately, junk all treaties and preferably directly indicate that yes, it will allow asylum seekers to freeze in the snow if need be.

In any case, most Finnish sectors feel that what the government is doing is correct. The parties in the government certainly agree, yet the largest opposition parties – the Social Democratic Party and the Centre – have also given their unqualified support.

The Greens support the line in a more qualified manner and some of their politicians have been critical, yet it’s only the Left Alliance, the leftmost party in the parliament, which has really offered tendentious criticism as a party. Even then it is unclear what the Left Alliance would do differently.

In pre-closure polling 75 % of Finns indicated they support closing the entire border and a third indicated that they do not consider humanitarian treaties something that always needs to be followed. Whatever small demonstrations have taken place have been organized by Russians living already in Finland.

This all, of course, goes to show that the Russian invasion of Ukraine has changed the national attitude quite rapidly and concretely. It is far easier to stop the entry of refugees when one can. Yet there are other factors, as well. I can’t help but think about how Covid era, inasmuch as people want to forget it, offered one example of how quick and easy it is for governments to actually close the borders and prevent entry in case of an emergency – and it’s been very easy to extend this from a pandemic emergency to other sorts of emergencies if need be.

The European union has given its unqualified support for the Finnish line, including sending in extra Frontex guards. This is of course a natural extension of EU’s general anti-Russian position, but also probably reflects a desire to avoid another 2015 situation.

During the 2015-2016 crisis, in fact, there was about a thousand of crossings to Finland from the Russian side, though at this point this was not usually considered a hybrid operation (mostly since there were far more coming from the Swedish side). While the Crimean invasion and all that had happened, the relations between Finland and Russia had not been completely cut off yet, and the Finnish state negotiated a treaty with Russia whereby Russia would prevent entry from third-party nationals, expect those from Belarus.

While there has been much speculation on what Russia’s motivation is, I would guess one of the main motivations would be for Finland to reopen direct negotiations with Russia, just like in 2015-2016. It remains to be seen if the two-week closure helps much after it ends, or if the same rigmarole repeats itself again. If the crisis becomes drawn out and extended, I would not be surprised if there were not eventually figures pushing for such negotiations, especially if the current trends of West slowly mentally detaching itself from Ukraine continue. We will see soon enough.

Image: Bing, “Finland Russia border in the winter”