NATO and its discontents

There is a fracas going on in Ukraine. Thus, Finland is once again going through a bout of discussion NATO membership.

Essentially, most things about Finnish security policy in general revolve around Russia, one way or another. The Finnish history basically consists of either periods where the country was either working with some other nation to counter Russia (starting from the 1100s-1200s when the tribes of Finns and Tavastians joined with Swedes to fight Novgorod, culminating in modern history in German alliances in 1918 and 1941-1944), or under Russian implicit influence or explicit rule. In the 2007, a Finnish conservative politician summarized Finland’s three main security policy considerations as “Russia, Russia and Russia”. This mentality is very widespread.

As such the debate is simple. The pro-NATO faction believes that Finland is under constant threat by Russian attack, which might materialize at any moment, and thinks that the only thing that will really defend against this eventuality is NATO. Likewise, the anti-NATO faction believes that while we do not currently face a threat from Russia we could not manage with our own forces, Finland would be under threat of becoming an arena of conflict if we did join, and fears that this would ruin our relationship with Russia (such as it is after the EU sanctions, post-Crimean invasion).

There are also deeper cultural attitudes at play. Spurring pro-NATO discourses is a belief that Finland is not sufficiently Western, or that it is still “Finlandized” – within Finland this usually refers to “internal Finlandization,” or Cold-War-era self-censorship in Finnish media and society on matters concerning Soviet Union, inherited also in the modern era. Likewise, NATO opponents often idealize Finland’s Cold-War-era neutrality and Finland as a “diplomatic superpower”, and there are deeper historical traumas regarding, for instance, Finland’s WW2 era (both in the sense “nobody helped us in Winter War, nobody will help us now either” and “we were allied in the Continuation War, look where that took us”) at play.

This creates a myopic effect. Questions like what Finland’s actual role in NATO would be (would Finland and Sweden joining just mean it is now the duty of those countries to defend the Baltic states in a potential war and US and other big countries could then focus elsewhere), as well as details like NATO’s other potential theaters and operations, are less considered. As far as Finns are concerned, NATO is either an organization meant to defend Finland from Russia or an organization intending to make Finland its frontline for a Russian conflict, and that is how it is likely to continue. All countries are similarly myopic about their affairs, of course.

This has gone on for 30 years. As the Cold War ended, along with Finlandization, the idea of Finland joining NATO became an actual possibility, and there has been a campaign for NATO membership by the Atlanticist faction in Finnish politics ever since. Despite this campaign, and despite widespread support for NATO among Finnish media, experts and opinionmakers, the last 30 years have continued the status quo; Finland is not a member, but still cooperates ever more extensively and maintains the “NATO option,” a phrase often mocked, particularly by NATO supporters. When Russia does stuff, NATO support goes up. When US does stuff, NATO support goes down.

It is not a wonder that the Ukrainian events would increase support for NATO. These sorts of affairs tend to make people in Finland very anxious. Russia being belligerent in countries that were once a part of the Russian Empire tends to do that to countries that were also a part of the Russian Empire. There also seems to be a bit of shift at the upper level of politics going on, with an increasing amount of previously critical figures announcing they are shifting to become pro-NATO.

One development in the debate is that, in addition to the traditional right/left orientation to the NATO question (right supports, left opposes), there is a new aspect at play. The increase in NATO support in all certainty comes from various educated urbanites who sympathize with the cosmopolitan idea of the West and oppose Russia due to its identification with conservatism, nationalism, and right-wing populism. Considering that Finnish left is becoming increasingly cosmopolitan and urbanite, as are the lefts in other countries, it’s not suprising that many new NATO supporters are center-left figures in the Greens and Social Democrats, though the farther left continues to be unaffected. On the other hand, there are also conservative NATO opponents, both among right-wing populists and among more mainstream conservatives, who prefer to conserve the traditional foreign policy line of neutrality.

This shouldn't be exaggerated, though - the NATO question continues to be very much a left-right issue, and moreso an issue where NATO supporters continue to be a public minority. Just yesterday, Finland’s PM – a left-wing social democrat - gave an interview confirming that short-term Finnish membership of NATO is unlikely, though the option is retained. Many NATO supporters have interpreted this as evidence of irresponsibility, though it is, as said, the same line as Finland has had for a long time. A bit longer ago, Finland’s President’s traditional New Year address was interpreted to be a sign that Finland is becoming more pro-NATO – though, in effect, he likewise basically reiterated our long-running policies. As one might see, nuances and interpretations are especially important here.

There are other countries to consider here, too. Russia, to be sure, though as one might guess any direct Russian attempts to mention they really, really would not prefer Finnish NATO membership will just be fuel to the fire for NATO supporters, as do sudden Russian actions like this. Sweden is a crucial country for Finland’s security policy, and it is a widespread belief that Swedish membership in NATO would force Finland to join as well – which makes it interesting that there are now marginally more NATO supporters than opponents in that country, at least according to one poll.

And, of course, Finland cannot just join NATO on its own, she must be accepted as a member – traditional power-politics and sphere-of-interest thinking might mean the door was closed even if we wanted to get in. Trump, we well remember, at least occasionally indicated that he sees NATO as a bad deal. He is not currently the president, but him, or someone who thinks like him, might be in the future. Or, in some ways, now; if the one thing that might bring Finland to NATO would be Russian actions, the one thing that might keep Finland out would be comments like Biden's line on 'minor incursion' in Ukraine.

Personally I continue to hold that NATO membership would cause Finland more risks than benefits. Finland’s situation is not like in Ukraine and Georgia, fraught and full of regionalized minorities that Russia might exploit for power politics; the most likely conflict scenario would continue to be a generalized conflict between West and Russia leading to violation of the neutrality of countries for strategic benefits regarding locations like Åland Islands and so on, and Finnish defence forces continue to be focused on preventing such incursions. Risks remain, but risks remain in all situations; one risk would be military alliance membership leading countries to a conflict over issues completely removed from them geographically or mentally, a scenario which would probably lead to a chipping away of the traditional Finnish defence mentality.

Furthermore, the missing link of Finnish discussions continues to be the more global aspect. It has been a general trend for American presidents to focus from Europe to the Pacific for some time now. Indeed, from the start of the Cold War, or even earlier on, there has long been a trend in the US that sees Europe as a declining and secondary continent and the Pacific arena, especially conflict with China, as will determine the future. The new cold war with China has now been pushed during several presidencies. If there is, for instance, a serious Baltic Sea conflict and a serious Pacific conflict going on at the same time - which is not an unlikely scenario at all - how many resources would the US focus on each of these? And if Finland and Sweden join NATO, how much would it affect the fact that the security of the Baltic Sea would in fact be simply left to these countries?

It is a good question in what sense there will even *be* a NATO to join in the mid-future, and it is an even better question whether American influence continues to be the dominant one in the coming world, or whether that would be a positive. For all the talk of West and Finland’s necessity of being a part of it? How much is the West even really an ideological, rather than (barely) geographical concept, let alone a positive one?

An often-used counterargument to the rhetoric about “The West” is Turkish participation in the NATO – but there are also more obviously “Western” countries in the mix whose policy is full of postcolonial wars of the sort that Finns have generally have a low desire for participation. And for all the counterposing of the West to Russian autocracy, plenty of Western politicians have expressed desire for making deals with Russia over the heads of the border countries. Are those politicians less “Western” – or are they just a part of a long, cynical Western tradition?