Russian claim to "denazification" is risible and holds little merit

Claims of denazification as an actual Russian motivation for Ukrainian invasion rest on a slippery ground.

Just before the Russian invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Putin gave a televised speech stating his reasons for invasion. There were claims of Ukraine threatening Russia by joining NATO, striving to obtain nuclear weapons, or placing the separatist regions in Donbass under threat. However, one of the more controversial claims was that Russia strives at achieving the “denazification” of Ukraine.

The ambiguity of “denazification” is almost certainly intentional. It is very possible that at the start of invasion the intent was a wholesale change of government – fall of Zelensky, the installation of a more pliant subject in the mold of Lukashenko in Kyiv. As it became evident that a quick end to war was not in sight, the demand has been either quietly dropped or scaled back.

What gives this demand some credence in various circles is that such movements do indeed exist. Militant groups like Azov Battalion exist, along with their history of using Nazi symbology. Idolization of violent figures like Stepan Bandera, who initially allied with the Nazis in 1941, has indeed taken place in Ukraine, even at the state level. This is not new information, either – or something left unreported: just yesterday, Helsingin Sanomat, Finland’s largest newspaper, published a large story on the presence of the Azovites on the Ukrainian side, and the related issues. The chances still remain this war ends in a negotiated treaty, and as such groups might be violently opposed to any such conceivable treaty, their presence is indeed notable.

However, when it comes to the territory of Ukraine, it is not just the Ukrainian government that has a Nazi problem. Unreconstructed Nazis have always also had a presence on the other side. Currently, much publicity is given to the Wagner Group of mercenaries and their Nazi symbology, which may be explained by typical mercenary “badass” machoism, but, for instance, the involvement of the Russian National Unity organization – whose logo is a stylized swastika and who have made no bones about their national socialism – on the side of the separatists has been quite a bit more substantial. And, of course, there has been a steady stream of European Nazis – not mere right-wing populists, but organizations like the Forza Nuova and the British BNP – offering their support to Russia in word and deed.

There’s a simple explanation for this incongruency. The definition of “Nazi” used by the Russian regime and its supporters is essentially different from any standard one. It can be summed up as: Being fundamentally opposed to the goals of the Russian regime makes you a Nazi, and if your interests are aligned with the Russian regime, you cannot be a Nazi.

This doesn’t mean one cannot be a Nazi and also be called a Nazi in accordance with the Russian definition. There are surely many far-right nationalists fundamentally opposed to Russia and the Russian regime, even more so nowadays with Russia’s stock falling in generally in the eyes of rest of Europe. Still, the fundamental problem with the Azovites in this discourse is not Nazi symbology, by any objective criteria. Rather, it is their refusal to accord with the Russian interests and, instead, fight against Russia.

It would be easy to dismiss this point as mere whataboutery, if it wasn’t connected to an essential observation: denazification does not necessarily mean making a territory free of Nazis, it simply means liquidating one category of far-righters (and plenty of other people aside) and simultaneously creating room for another category to operate.

Online, one occasionally encounters American and other international nationalists who have entered such ideological death spirals as to claim that Azov should ally with Russia to fight the “globohomo”, “Global American Empire”, or whatever other terms they have come up with. Imagine some Azovites were indeed to do this. Should their claims be taken seriously by the Russian side, possibilities that they could, indeed, maintain all of their other opinions on other subjects if they simply made this switch. This would, then, count as a sufficient “denazification” of the Azov Battalion.

Perhaps this can be illustrated with a comparison. The use of “Nazi” by the partisans of the Russian government can be compared to the use of the word “antisemite” by the partisans of the Israeli government. “Antisemitism”, after all, is a frequent accusation leveled against the critics of Israeli occupation and general Israeli belligerence. It is also indeed true that there are plenty of critics and enemies of Israel who traffic in antisemitism, whether we are talking about Nazis or various operators in Palestine and other Arabic countries, or conspiracy theorists.

Nevertheless, all too often all it takes to be called an antisemite is a consistent opposition to policies of occupation and annexation when Israel does it just as when other countries do it. It has also been easy for far-right European movements with a long history of antisemitism to receive absolution for their sins just by visiting Israel and expressing sufficient support.

Many other countries wield similar accusation with equivalent levels of cynicism and tendentiousness. Surely it should not be a surprise for Russia to do likewise. Likewise it is unsurprising that such claims would focus on “Nazis”, considering the importance of the mythos of the Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany in the general Russian patriotic mythology.

Of course, the Russian state and regime itself bear many classic hallmarks of fascism, from irredentist expansionism to social authoritarianism to the noisy propaganda of the “Z” movement. Nevertheless, far-right groups have also often come under the hammer in Russia. Just some weeks before the Ukrainian invasion started, far-right blogger Egor Prosvirnin fell out of the window of his flat. Whether this has been done by Russian secret services is still an open question, but in general Russian nationalists have surely not been spared from repression by authorities.

The catch is, though, that this is not related to their nationalism but the fact that Russian ethnonationalism is, at least for the moment, not congruent with the multiethnic characteristic of actual Russia; Russian state continues to need its minorities, particularly as they heavily populate the lower ranks of the Russian army.

At an even deeper level, though, it all comes back to the simple question of loyalty. It is possible to be “far-right”, “far-left”, a “liberal”, whatever – as long as you can demonstrate your ability to demonstrate your compatibility with the state’s plans. And however hard it is to be a nationalist in Russia, surely it is always more difficult to be an even wronger kind of a nationalist - a member of a movement wishing separation from Russia, or the maintenance of that separation in countries that have achieved their independence.

All in all, though, a fundamental point remains to be made. One of the main causes bolstering nationalist and authoritarian ideologies in Ukraine is the Russian invasion, beginning in 2014 and intensifying in 2022. If there had not been Russian invasion of Crimea and the subsequent stoking of the “Russian Spring” movement in Donbass territories into a separatist movement, there would be no room for Azov Battalion.

There is little need to argue, for instance whether the civilians in Mariupol suffer due to the Azov Battalion or Russian troops (or both, or neither) when one remembers that if the Russia had not taken the choice to launch a full-scale invasion month ago, this would be just another day in Mariupol, just like in the eight years before, instead of another step in a descent to hell. Working against the rise of far-right nationalism in Ukraine begins with the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukrainian territory – and the same applies to the rise of far-right nationalism in Russia.